Desicritics Author: Dweep

A Post-Mumbai Agenda II: Managing Pakistan

Dweep — Tue, 16 Dec 2008 08:55:21 EST

The title of this post might be somewhat controversial, particularly to a Pakistani. Yet, there is an obvious imperative for India to "manage" Pakistan. Clear evidence has emerged that the attack in Mumbai originated from Pakistan. While Pakistan's government has denied any part in the planning, it is also clear that Laskhar-e-Taiba, the main instigator, received substantial support from elements within the ISI and military, over the years. What is more, Laskhar's front organization, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, had been allowed to function and grow without hindrance, throughout Pakistan, suggesting condonation, if not complicity.

That Pakistan had a part to play in the Mumbai attacks should surprise no one that has seen many such attacks happen and forgotten. The most vivid is the 2001 attack on India's Parliament, following which India mobilized its army. After several months on the brink of war, both sides pulled back, with Pakistan providing commitments to control terrorists within its borders. As we now know, those commitments were false.

Faced with repeated failures to contain Pakistan, what is India to do?

Setting the Ground Rules

Despite the desire to exact revenge, any action by India must be measured on more than the pain it inflicts. Rather, as Condoleezza Rice said, “any response needs to be judged by its effectiveness in prevention and also by not creating other unintended consequences or difficulties.” What is need, in other words, is a strategy to "manage" Pakistan, rather than to retaliate to it.

So far, India's response has been measured and calm. India has depended on the US to exert influence on Pakistan. This seems to be yielding some results. Pakistan has arrested Lashkar terrorists, closed offices of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, and placed its founder (Hafiz Mohammad) under house arrest. India's maturity in avoiding the temptation to retaliate militarily is good news. After all, we have tried military mobilization before and gained nothing. An outright military intervention not only risks escalation into a nuclear conflict, it would be counter-productive – alienating liberal forces within the establishment, while uniting the country against India. This is the "unintended consequences" that Ms. Rice was referring to.

There is, however, a second yardstick by which action must be measured. It must send a clear message to Pakistan that support of terror is not a viable option. As Pranab Mukherjee has said, "mere expression of intention is not adequate." That those responsible may have been non-state actors, is irrelevant. Action by India must clarify that non-state actors are the responsibility of States that harbor them. Even if the state in question – Pakistan – is only in partial control of its apparatus, that does not excuse those in charge of their responsibility.

This analysis suggests there are two forces India must contend with, balancing which is extremely difficult. First, India must send unequivocal messages that it is serious about its security and will punish those it sees as responsible. Simultaneously, however, India must accept the reality that Pakistan is a state teetering on the edge of failure – and in some regions it is a failed state. Extreme reactions, such as military intervention, risk aggravating that situation.

Building A Strategy

So far, India has borne the brunt of this tradeoff. Under US pressure, India did not cross the LoC during the Kargil war, did not take direct military action in 2001, and has avoided a similar action this year. In other words, the status quo has favored Pakistan.

This must change. Indeed, India's strategy must be two pronged. First, India must change the status quo, using Mumbai as an excuse to dramatically shift negotiating power in its favor. Second, Pakistan must be made to face this tradeoff. By offering both carrots and sticks, India must drive home the point that Pakistan has choices, and stands to loose everytime it condones terror against India.

Sizing Response Options: The Stick

So, where does this leave us? There are several ideas India can employ. First, let us look at a few that can punish Pakistan.

Inflict Economic Pain: Perhaps the easiest retaliation is non-military. India has several economic tools at its disposal, including stopping all imports from Pakistan, banning overflight by Pakistani airlines, and significantly restricting travel between the two countries. No doubt, Pakistan will retaliate, but the pain will be asymmetrically more for Pakistan.

Covert Retaliation: In the immediate aftermath of Mumbai, some commentators suggested that India follow Israel's example, after the Munich massacre, of covertly hunting down those responsible. Indeed, India should prepare for such action. It is doubtful if India has the capabilities for such an operation. Nevertheless, and while Pakistan is attempting to prosecute those responsible, such an action would carry many benefits. Not only will it force India to upgrade its capabilities, it will also be a useful backup option should Pakistan later release those responsible. It would be a clear signal to Pakistan (and the USA) that if it does not act, India will.

"Surgical" Strikes: The logical escalation of covert operations, is actual military intervention. One option is to conduct "surgical" strikes in Pakistan, but particularly in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) at suspected terror camps. This can be done. India seems to know, with reasonable certainty, where these camps are. Yet, such strikes risk uniting all of Pakistan against India, strengthen the fundamentalists, and most critically, would alienate India globally. Consider, after all, that US airstrikes in Pakistan's west are already highly controversial. Strikes by India, the country's arch enemy, would weaken Zardari, while strengthening those elements in the ISI that have long supported Laskhar and their brethren. This, therefore, would be foolhardy and probably defines the threshold that India cannot easily cross.

All-out Assault: There is one exception where a military assault on Pakistan should be considered – in the immediate aftermath of a Mumbai-style attack. Should such an attack happen again, India can – and should – launch a limited but intense attack on the PoK. Of course, such an assault would have to be limited to Kashmir, have clear geographical objectives, and be ceased unilaterally within hours or days to avoid escalation. Nevertheless, by taking back occupied territory India can improve its strategic position and change the status quo that has long been in Pakistan's favor.

Sizing Response Options: The Carrot

Of course, giving Pakistan "the stick" is counter-productive, without a few carrots as well. So, here's a few:

Sharing Intelligence: In the past, Pakistan has always demanded that India share intelligence to backup its claims that attacks are supported from within Pakistan. India should oblige, and call Pakistan's bluff. Indeed, to the extent possible, India should make some intelligence public. Not only will this substantiate India's case globally, it would remove one more area for Pakistan to hide from inaction. India can then demand intelligence in return – and again measure if its words are mere "expression of intent."

Joint Military Exercises: As an out-of-the box method, why not propose joint military exercises with Pakistan's government, and possibly joint patrols in the border regions of India – and Afghanistan? Obviously, this won't happen overnight, given Pakistan's suspicion of India. Nevertheless, it would give India the opportunity to size up its neighbor's intentions – to prevent cross-border terrorism – clearly. Should it become evident that Pakistan is not living up to its side of the bargain, in stopping infiltration, India could then take retaliatory measures.

Economic Free Trade Zone: The strongest incentive India can offer - and should offer immediately - is economic. For instance, President Zardari indicated an interest in creating a free-trade zone. Such a plan has long been under discussion. Now, India should unilaterally offer to cut tariffs on all Pakistani imports. Pakistan would benefit in the short term. But this would strengthen moderate elements in Pakistan. Best of all, it would give India additional future leverage over Pakistan, by making the threat of sanctions that much more painful.

Retaliation Is a Balancing Act

The Mumbai attacks have led to a lot of soul searching in India, resulting in some very creative thinking. Some have, for instance, suggested a reunification of South Asia. It is a testament to Indians desire for peace that, rather than baying for blood, they are thinking positive. Nevertheless, Indian policymakers must operate within the realm of reality.

In the wake of the attacks, India has all but ruled out military action. This gives Pakistan's government the cover to pursue terrorists domestically, without alienating itself from the majority. But India cannot, and should not, depend on US pressure alone to alter Pakistan's track record of harboring terrorists. Once that pressure is gone Pakistan is likely to return to its erring ways. To avoid that, what is needed is a long-term, sustained, and consistent policy on rewarding Pakistan for good behavior, and punishing it for bad.

India should start by offering a range of incentives that draw the two countries closer. This will strengthen Pakistan's liberals, and if nothing else stabilize the country – a result India should desire anyway. Nevertheless, India must simultaneously prepare for, and execute, covert operations that provide India a "second" lever.

This is the conclusion of a series of articles on the Mumbai attacks. Previous articles looked at what went wrong, and lessons for India's domestic securityapparatus.

Another Post-Mumbai Agenda: Getting Internal Security Right

Dweep — Mon, 8 Dec 2008 21:11:24 EST

This is part 1 of a two part series on actions India should take, post-Mumbai. Part 2 will look at the specific challenge of managing Pakistan.

A picture has emerged of how the Mumbai attacks were planned and executed, mostly in Pakistan. The NY Times highlights evidence that Pakistan was the source of the attackers and the group behind it had received substantial support from the ISI. The report quotes not just the Mumbai police, but former Defense Department officials.

A picture is also emerging of the "rot" in India's own criminal justice and intelligence systems, pointed out most effectively by the BBC.

The attacks and their aftermath again point to the rot that has set into the country's internal security system and a lack of cohesion between civilian and security wings of the government...One telling example: six days after the attack, even the number of dead and injured keeps going up and down, due to poor co-ordination between the police and hospitals.

The Prime Minister has pledged to act with "resolve and determination" but what does that mean? The temptation to lean on Pakistan is strong, yet India's government might do better to learn a few basic lessons first. Here are a few.

Win the Information War
First, learn to win the war for world opinion. This should hardly be difficult, given the immense sympathy India has garnered over the attacks. Yet, the government can bungle this too.

For one, constant allusions to "external elements" and "neighbors" do not help. India has made it a habit of crying wolf and pointing to Pakistan everytime anything goes wrong. This, unfortunately, increases the burden of proof on India. That India pointed to Pakistan within hours of the attacks suggested either prior knowledge or - more likely to the public eye - the usual fearmongering. That is why an NY Times article is more credible when it quotes the US Defense Department, than the Mumbai police or Shivraj Patil. Make your words count.

Second, be consistent and professional in releasing information. If there is one thing that marked the operations in Mumbai, it was the many contradictory statements released in turn by the head of the NSG, an Army General, the Mumbai police commissioner, and the Home Minister. Protecting the credibility of information is as important as protecting the information. It was never clear who exactly was in charge of the operations, leading the bystander to believe that no one was in charge.

Finally, control the channels by which information is released. Is it not surprising that to find "evidence" of Pakistan's involvement, one has to go to the NYTImes? Why is the Home Ministry not releasing the evidence and ensuring that its security officials not "leak" information to the press?

Get Security Right
Winning the information war is about getting perceptions right - that India's authorities are in control and not simply smoking pot when they accuse Pakistan. If India can convince the US and Pakistan that it knows what it is doing, it will also convince them of the earnestness of India's words - and if necessary, threats.

But you cannot have others believe you are serious if your house is in disarray. And India's security apparatus certainly is. Nine hours for the NSG to get to Mumbai, three days to get the terrorists, and another two days to clear out bombs from the train station at Mumbai!

To be taken seriously, India must fix its anti-terror mechanism. And a first step is to invest heavily in the local police. The local policeman is India's first defense against crime and terror. It is these people - long reviled and under paid - who face the first bullets, secure crime scenes, and call in the big guns. You cannot expect to be safe if these people are not motivated to protect you. Fixing the local police will not be easy, nor cheap. It requires that every state pay its policemen more, invest in better training, offer better equipment and a safer work environment, and improve communications across state police and military intelligence divisions. The creation of a "federal" agency or a stronger law is useless, if we cannot catch the people to begin with.

Second, leverage technology. Britain's enthusiastic adoption of video surveillance in the 1990's, in response to IRA attacks, shows how successful it can be - at least in managing the aftermath. Today, London has over 10,000 cameras, and Britain over 4 million (1 for every 14 people - the highest in the world). The cost of technology, critical to coordinating first-response between fire, medical, and police services, is dropping exponentially. There is really no excuse for why India's police forces still operate with WWII era walkie talkies.

Third, upgrade the NSG to be one of the best anti-terror response units in the world. India is one of the most frequently attacked countries - it needs to have a matching capability. Yet, in the BBC article a security analyst illustrates how the NSG have no dedicated aircraft and insufficient training in responding to a Mumbai-style attack:

The commandos have been trained to rescue small groups of people. "They have not been trained on multiple location operations of such scale."

Four, India needs to be creative in its training of the NSG - and this will come from working with more creative partners. Why not train with Israeli and US security forces on a regular basis? Their agencies, amongst the best in the world, would not only be willing to share intelligence, but also tactics. Mumbai shows that whether we like it or not, the terrorists see us as one group of enemies. So it is time we embraced our new allies.

Finally, the NSG should be a dedicated anti-terror unit, not a team meant to provide protective cover to corrupt politicians. In the USA, the Secret Service does not conduct anti-terror operations, just as SWAT, Seal, and other special forces teams do not provide individual protection services. The former is dedicated to protecting key people, the latter to anti-terror operations. Likewise, the NSG should not be wasted on protecting corrupt politicians, the bulk of whom should be protected by local police. And, doing so would have the added benefit of creating incentives for politicians to improve local law enforcement.

Mumbai: An Opportunity to Reflect
Mumbai was a wake-up call. It seems increasingly likely that the attack was planned in Pakistan, yet the inability to prevent it or to respond effectively was a domestic failure. It brings home the rot, not only in our police system, but in our politics.

In such an environment, it is easy to lash out at an "external party" and in time India must do so. Yet, Mumbai offers us the opportunity to look within before we look without. India's first act of determination must be to set our own house in order. It will be difficult and politically tricky for the Congress to admit to lapses. But if the government is serious about tackling terror, they must follow the advice of an earstwhile opponent, Iqbal:

Khudi ko kar buland itna ke har taqdeer se pehle khuda bande se khud poochhe bata teri raza kya hai

Why the NSG Should Not Protect Politicians

Dweep — Thu, 4 Dec 2008 07:11:20 EST

Sure, there is the desire to make inept politicians pay for what happened in Mumbai. But there are some more fundamental reasons why.

First, the NSG should be a dedicated anti-terror unit. The Secret Service does not conduct anti-terror operations; nor do SWAT, Seal, and other special forces not provide protection services. The former is dedicated to protecting people, the latter to anti-terror response. Likewise, the NSG should do what it does best.

One benefit of such a move would be to free up resources within the NSG, sorely needed to improve the state of the NSG. As the BBC mentions, the NSG lack dedicated aircraft - which accounts for their delay in getting to Mumbai. They also are not trained in the kind of operations Mumbai required:

The commandos have been trained to rescue small groups of people. "They have not been trained on multiple location operations of such scale."

India is one of the most frequently attacked countries - and needs to have a matching capability to respond. Freeing the NSG from protective service duty will allow it to grow to be one of the best anti-terror response units in the world.

But there is an even more pressing reason for India's politicians to be protected by the local police. It is simply a matter of giving them incentives to care for the dismal state of policing and invest more in it.

That investment is sorely needed. While India pressures Pakistan to act, what is clear is that Mumbai was a domestic failure of local law enforcement. The only way to ensure this does not happen again is for India to invest heavily in its criminal and security systems.

And a first step is to reform the local police. The local policeman is Indians first defense against terrorists of the kind that hit Mumbai. It is these people - long reviled and under paid - who face the first bullets, secure crime scenes, and call in the big guns. We cannot expect to be safe if these people are not motivated and equipped to protect us. That means paying policemen more, investing in better training, better equipment and a safer work environment, and improving communications across state police and military intelligence. The creation of a "federal" agency or a stronger law is useless, if we cannot catch the people to begin with.

India's politicians have grown fat and lazy on pork, and <a href="http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers30%5Cpaper2951.html">disconnected from the insecurity</a> that grips the country. It is a natural principle of democracy that those that represent a country's citizens have the same protections as the common man. No more, no less. It is time that happened, because nothing else will encourage our politicians to care for the security of Indian citizens.

What Will It Take To Be Safe?

Dweep — Mon, 1 Dec 2008 09:49:46 EST

Who is to blame for the carnage in Mumbai?

The first answer that our government gave us was Pakistan. Yet, that answer came too soon to be entirely credible.

The second answer, to arrive with the end of the siege, was Shivraj Patil. In all honesty, Shivraj Patil should have been fired long ago, but not for incompetence – a trait he shares with most of India’s politicians. Rather, his true fault was stupidity, illustrated by a penchant for shooting ill-timed statements from the hip.

The WSJ, for its part, claimed Mumbai was a failure of broader political leadership in the Congress. That is certainly true. But what are the alternatives? Can the BJP, for instance, live up to its claim to be “hard on terror”? After all, the boat that brought the terrorists to Mumbai came through Gujarat, a state ruled by the BJP. What does “hard on terror” mean, anyway? The BJP wants a stronger anti-terror law. But passing laws does not make us safe. If that worked we would all be highly educated and have universal healthcare! And let us not forget that the BJP would also give us more Ayodhya’s and Godhra’s. Trading in civil liberties, sacrificing secularism, and alienating 140 million Indian Muslims would hardly make for a safer India.

It is not surprising that the PM blamed "external elements" within a day. But nobody asked him why he cried wolf so quickly, so often? And the temptation to blame the incumbent party, as the BJP is doing, is strong too – yet has anyone asked the BJP what it would do?

The ugly truth is that this is our own fault. As they say: fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.

Pakistan has supported terrorists in India for decades: we have done nothing. This is not the first attack to happen on Shivraj Patil's watch: we let him stay on. We chose this spineless government, let Shivraj Patil stay on, and accepted previous attacks as a way of life. The buck stops - at us.

In the book India After Gandhi, Ramachandra Guha says that India’s true success since independence has been the political empowerment of its communities. Yet, that success is today our undoing. Our politicians see themselves as representatives of Hindus, dalits, Muslims, Tamils, and the poor. But who represents the interest of India and Indians over that of any single community?

So, are we doomed to repeat the failures of the past? What can we learn?

First, Mumbai makes it clear, if it wasn’t already painfully evident, that we face a highly organized and determined enemy. Pictures of elite commandoes rappelling down from helicopters may have cheered many an Indian. Yet, why did it take an entire day for the commandos to get to Mumbai? It took three days to get four terrorists out of the Taj. In security, as in much else, one gets what one pays for. Is it fair to expect underpaid police officers and first responders secure us from highly motivated, well paid, enemies? To be safer, we must invest in those that protect us.

Money, unfortunately, does not grow on trees. Where will it come from, in a country where 40% of government spending goes to corrupt politicians? India’s business community is angry. Yet, that community, of small traders and large corporations, constantly operates outside the sphere of legality. Each of us condones the black market, forgetting that it deprives the country of critical tax revenues. A private good is also a public liability.

Most of all, no amount of money will deliver us to safety till we have full accountability in politics. India was warned of a potential threat to Mumbai from the sea. Given such specific warnings, who failed to act? A full public inquiry is a first step to moving forward. One head is not enough – several others must roll.

What happened in Mumbai is a terrible tragedy. Yet the real tragedy would be to continue with politics as usual. Prashant Agrawal offers hope in the WSJ, that "the change is going to run deeper than new faces. India is on the brink of a revolution: where divisive, petty, corrupt politics take a back seat."

I hope he is right. Mumbai offers us the opportunity to look within, before we look without. Let us make examples of those that chose to be lethargic. But let us also change what we demand of our leaders and ourselves.

True safety is not merely in more troops on the border, or better equipped police. It is in a higher standard of living for all those within our borders, a shared identity of nationhood, and a system that holds those in power accountable to those that put them there.

If we fail to learn from Mumbai, we will be doomed to repeat it. Mumbai and its dead will become martyrs of Carl Wendell Hines Jr.:

Now that he is safely dead Let us praise him Build monuments to his glory Sing hosannahs to his name. Dead men make convenient heroes: They cannot rise to challenge the images we would fashion from their lives. And besides, It is easier to build monuments than to make a better world. So, now that he is safely dead we, with eased consciences will teach our children that he was a great man... knowing that the cause for which he lived is still a cause and the dream for which he died is still a dream, a dead man's dream

This is the first in a two-part series. Part 2 will look at possible political and military options for engagement and retaliation.

Kashmiri Muslims and Their Choices

Dweep — Thu, 23 Oct 2008 12:47:59 EDT

India has just opened a border post for trade through Kashmir, to Pakistan occupied Kashmir. Yet, just months earlier, massive protests had broken out in Kashmir, over the transfer of a small piece of land to a Hindu trust. The transfer was meant to facilitate an annual hindu pilgrimage, by constructing temporary shelters. Yet, the Muslims in the Kashmir valley were furious, accusing the state government of planning to change the region's demography. As a result, hundreds of thousands of Muslims protests that eventually turned into demonstrations against Indian presence by separatists.

The sight of hundreds of thousands of Muslim protesters saying prayers in public to protest against their government stands in stark contrast to what is happening to another set of Muslims not far from Kashmir. In Xinjiang to the North West the Chinese government severely restricts the practice of Islam.

To be a practicing Muslim in the vast autonomous region of northwestern China called Xinjiang is to live under an intricate series of laws and regulations intended to control the spread and practice of Islam, the predominant religion among the Uighurs, a Turkic people uneasy with Chinese rule.

Two of Islam’s five pillars — the sacred fasting month of Ramadan and the pilgrimage to Mecca called the hajj — are also carefully controlled. Students and government workers are compelled to eat during Ramadan, and the passports of Uighurs have been confiscated across Xinjiang to force them to join government-run hajj tours rather than travel illegally to Mecca on their own.

The protests in Kashmir destroyed the temporary calm and propriety that had returned to the Valley, and created a massive gulf between Jammu and Kashmir. Yet, the Indian government goes forth with its peace agenda. This begs the question - what is it exactly the Muslims in Kashmir want? Are they doing themselves any favors?

Let us look at how Kashmiri Muslims have fared compared to Muslims in the region. What are the choices Kashmiri Muslims have?

On the issue of demography, it is easy to bring up China and its policies in Tibet. As Kanwal Sibal points out:

China, in Tibet next door, has changed the territory’s demography by settling Hans there in large numbers, reducing the Tibetans to a minority in Lhasa. It is ruthlessly exploiting Tibet’s natural resources, ignoring environmental norms...Its policies are guided essentially by security considerations, to establish an iron grip on the territory and neutralize any challenge to its authority there.

India’s policies have been incomparably more humane than China’s. India could have steadily changed the state’s demography, early after Independence...[or] after 1965 and 1971. India took no decisions with demographic implications even with Pakistan openly abetting terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir post-1990 and introducing a new level of challenge to the Indian State. The reverse demographic change brought about by the eviction of the Kashmiri Pandits from the valley has still not been undone.

Let us set the record straight. While China suppresses its minorities, India goes to great lengths to preserve their identities, cultures, and territories. No other country in the world prevents free movements of its own citizens within its borders. India does, in the North East, but particularly in Kashmir.

Kashmiri Muslims also do better socially on the Indian side. The literacy rate in Kashmir, at 54.46%, is higher than the Indian average. No comparison can be made with Pakistan Occupied Kashmir because no statistics exist on PoK. But female literacy in Kashmir, at about 45%, is well above the Pakistani average of 35%. And the lack of statistics on PoK illustrates Pakistan's attitude to the region. As Lord Kelvin said, "To measure is to know." Apparently, Pakistan would rather keep the true state of affairs in Pakistan unknown, than give them a chance to improve.

Compare the vitality of NGOs active in Kashmir to protect the (obviously trampled upon) rights of Kashmiris, with the deafening silence of any opposition in PoK against Pakistan and the contrast is striking. Indian women are currently fighting to reserve 1/3 of all national assembly seats for women; Pakistan is celebrating more women just running for office. Kashmiris go to the polls every year in relatively free and fair polls. When was the last election in PoK?

PoK (or Azad Kashmir) has become South Asia's Palestine, with parts annexed by Pakistan. Pakistan relegates its residents to a legal limbo that denies them citizenship of either India or Pakistan, merely to prove a point. Meanwhile, India grants all its citizens free movement throughout the world.

No doubt, the Indian state has been heavy handed in Kashmir, as elsewhere. Rights have been violated and innocent people shot. It is hard to be objective in such a situation. Yet, it is also clear that not all Muslims are equal. India celebrates its authors; Pakistan relegates its to misery even when they win the Nobel prize. Pakistan's closest ally, China, mistreats its Muslims; Pakistan stays silent. India sends a probe to the moon; Pakistan goes to the IMF for a rescue package.

Ultimately, we are all responsible for the choices we make. For those protesting in Kashmir, and taking their right to do so for granted, these are the choices they are overlooking.

Taslima Nasreen Leaves Kolkata: A Giant Defeat for Secularism

Dweep — Thu, 22 Nov 2007 13:47:27 EST

The BBC has just reported that Taslima Nasreen, the Bangladeshi author at the heart of Kolkata's riots has left the city for Jaipur. This follows a demand by Kolkata police to Taslima that she leave the city.

This is a tragedy of colossal proportions, akin to Modi's support of the Godhra riots. Since when is it the government's responsibility to evict law abiding residents of the territory, simply because a bunch of hooligans - Muslim or Hindu - decide to burn the city?

The government's action brings to mind two things. First, it stands in stark contrast to this article by a UK economist, celebrating diversity:

Diversity broadens the range of cultural experiences available in a city or country. As a Londoner, I’m delighted that local restaurants now serve food from around the world, rather than just the awful British stuff we once had to put up with...The biggest economic benefit of diversity is that it stimulates new ideas, which are the source of most economic growth, which in turn pays for the good schools, hospitals and other public goods that we value.

Second, one wonders what is the future for the rest of us in India? India's great cities have each slowly turned fundamentalist - Delhi in 1984, Bombay in 1992, and now Kolkata.

The biggest tragedy, however, is that this country's moderate Muslims and Hindus remain silent - again. The political parties - rather than uniting behind Taslima, rejecting calls for her visa to be canceled, and denouncing the AIMF for the fundamentalists that they are, all parties have remained largely silent. They worry, perhaps, about disturbing their Muslim vote bank. So why does the Muslim vote bank not speak up?

We would do well, after all, to remember the words of anti-Nazi Pastor Martin Niemöller:

First they came for the Jews and I did not speak out because I was not a Jew.

Then they came for the Communists and I did not speak out because I was not a Communist.

Then they came for the trade unionists and I did not speak out because I was not a trade unionist.

Then they came for me and there was no one left to speak out for me.

Concluding the Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Moving Beyond Blame

Dweep — Mon, 27 Aug 2007 00:07:50 EDT

All hell has broken loose in the Indian parliament since the 123 Agreement was concluded between India and the USA. Following its conclusion the UPA government faces rebellion from the Left (the communists), the right (the BJP), and within. The imbroglio has been sufficiently covered in both domestic and international media, and seems to the result of domestic politics, posturing, and egos. It is not my purpose to add to that verbose discussion. Rather, I wish to ask: how can the government conclude this agreement?

The Frame of Reference: What is the Agreement About?

That begs another more fundamental question: what is this nuclear deal about and is it in India’s favor?

Many justifications have been given for this deal – among them access to nuclear technology, China, and Pakistan. Each successive justification has been met with resistance from a different quarter, leading M.K. Bhadrakumar to note that, “No one in the Indian establishment is able to explain cogently what this nuclear agreement is all about."

To move forward, let us drop all pretensions about this deal. The Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation agreement is not about “nuclear cooperation,” but about Indo-US cooperation.

Even that, however, is a near-term means to a more significant long-term end. The deal sets a precedent for India to create a country-specific niche for itself in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and establishes that it can alter the international system to its benefit. The agreement, therefore, is about India’s ability to bend the rules of the international system to its benefit.

The stakes for India are, essentially, very high. Much higher, in fact, than the Prime Minister has been able to articulate. His inability to place the deal in this context is at the heart of the current stalemate; for while the government has been deft at bargaining internationally, it has been incompetent at doing so domestically.

Discrediting the Naysayers and their Arguments

Getting domestic political support in parliament on the deal requires two concomitant actions. The first is to discredit the arguments of the right and the left. Thankfully, this is easily done - once the correct “frame of reference” is articulated.

The Left argues that Indians do not want to align with the US. This is plain wrong. Most Indians care more about their next meal than about foreign policy. Those that do not have such existential worries - the middle class - remain largely pro-American, as revealed in many international polls.

The Communists' ideological opposition is hardly surprising given its history of undermining India’s very existence - during colonial rule they worked against the nationalists; in the post-independence era they actively conspired against the government to encourage a communist revolution taking orders from China or Russia. Their position proves only that they support their ideology, not India. Their support is unlikely, and therefore inconsequential.

The BJP has a more technical concern - that the deal restricts India’s foreign policy. This is, true, but it is not a criticism of the deal. That is because the agreement does not bind India’s hands any more than they are bound at present. For instance, under the Hyde Act the US will be required to end cooperation if India tests a nuclear weapon. However, if India were to test a nuclear weapon now, sanctions would still follow. If anything limits India's foreign policy, it is not the deal but how important the PMO considers it. And to say that the agreement will limit India’s foreign policy options is no criticism at all – because India’s options are already limited.

IAEA and NSG Agreements: A Package to Keep or Loose

The second action to develop domestic consensus needs to be to present a face saving compromise for the left but particularly the right. For political reasons neither can abandom their current position, unless presented with a situation that either seems to vindicate their current position or makes it indefensible.

There is only one situation that does so. It requires India conclude agreements with the IAEA and the NSG, then present all three agreements as a package for approval to parliament.

This strategy, of moving forward with the NSG and IAEA, has several benefits. First, time is of the essence - the US Congress must approve the entire deal early next year before campaigning starts in earnest for the presidential elections. Second, it will illustrate that the agreement has broad support, including from China and Japan. This will take the bite out of the left’s argument that this is only about the US. And, by allowing India access to diversified suppliers, it will alleviate the Right’s concern that the agreement may tie India’s hands.

It is not an accident that the US administration will present the 123 Agreement, the IAEA safeguards agreement, and the NSG agreement to the US Congress as a package. A vote on the package, rather than on specific sections, presents US policymakers with a stark choice - to vote in favor of, or against, “strategic cooperation” with India. Faced with that choice only an ideologue, and only one impervious to the strong Indian lobby, would vote against the entire package. The Indian administration needs to do the same, rather than allow a parochial legislature veto power on every segment of international deal making.

123: Not the Endgame

The 123 Agreement is not, as some might say, the end game. Rather, it should be viewed as the start of India’s involvement in developing friendly international frameworks.

Even the current agreement is the first of three, two of which are yet to be concluded. In the ensuing negotiations with the NSG, the current imbroglio in parliament is actually beneficial to India, because domestic constraints in the form of the legislative-executive divide significantly strengthen India’s bargaining position. Of course, using that as leverage requires the Prime Minister extract himself from a stalemate of his own making.

The only way forward for the government is to explain what this deal is about - the rise of India on the international stage. That rise is aided by America, but is not for it. Second, the government must present the deal’s opponents with a stark choice – to support India’s aggressive and independent foreign policy, or not.

Court Rejects Novartis' Patent Challenge, Dilutes India's Sovereignty

Dweep — Tue, 7 Aug 2007 00:01:41 EDT

Earlier today (Aug 6, 2007), the Chennai High Court rejected Novartis' legal challenge to section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act. Given the charged nature of the issue, the decision received near blanket coverage globally, and was covered by Reuters, Forbes, IHT as well as by NGOs such as SocialFunds, SciDev and KaiserNetwork. In rejecting Novartis' case, the court stated simply that it did not have jurisdiction over the issue.

Novartis is, of course disappointed. Its company's news release states that:

"We disagree with this ruling, however we likely will not appeal to the Supreme Court. We await the full decision to better understand the Court's position," said Ranjit Shahani, Vice-Chairman and Managing Director, Novartis India Limited.

It is interesting that Novartis has chosen not to appeal. Civil society organizations are calling this a 'victory for generics'. But the truth is not so glorious. Indeed, it is tragic that the Chennai High Court said that it did not have jurisdiction. Novartis' case argued that the Patent Act violated terms of the WTO's TRIPS agreement. Yet, what section 3(d) simply did was to take advantage of flexibilities provided by the Doha Declaration on Public Health, which allowed for a looser intellectual property regime than was originally enforced by TRIPS. By challenging section 3(d), Novartis challenged much of what had been gained by the Doha Declaration (see here for a more detailed analysis, and here for a prior report on the outcome).

The Chennai High Court has created two problems, due to its stand that it does not have jurisdiction.

First, this means that the legality of the IPA is still in limbo, and others may question its use of TRIPS flexibilities. The rejection itself is a short-term boon to public health proponents such as MSF. Yet, in the long-term, it leaves the IPA vulnerable to change.

Even more critically, the decision suggests that the appropriate jurisdiction lies with the WTO. If that position were accepted by the Supreme Court or the WTO, it would hand jurisdiction of an issue of critical national interest to a multilateral forum. Essentially, India's national laws would be beholden to a forum designed not for the dispensation of justice but for international negotiations and bargaining.

This is in sharp contrast to the US' approach, which has categorically and repeatedly refused to accept the jurisdiction of multilateral institutions on issues of national interest, including human rights and criminal law. If allowed to proliferate, this view is a serious long-term threat to India's ability to make use of TRIPS flexibilities - indeed any flexibilities in international law, without being threatened at the WTO.

PIL Against the Indo-US Nuclear Deal - Foreign Policy by Judiciary?

Dweep — Sat, 12 May 2007 00:32:59 EDT

The Hindustan Times reports that an IIT scientist from Mumbai has filed a public interest litigation (PIL) against the Indo-US nuclear deal. Claiming the deal is detrimental to the country's interest, Mr. Ramamurthy wants the Supreme Court to "restrain the Central Government from hurriedly executing any agreement with the US till it was thoroughly examined by an apex court-appointed Committee."

This is the most frivolous litigation I have heard of, and the Supreme Court would do well to throw out the PIL without even listening to it.

Technically speaking, it is a little premature to ask the Supreme Court to step in, and may not have jurisdiction. After all, as a judicial and constitutional authority it can only adjudicate on laws passed by government. So far, no law has been passed by parliament, so there is nothing to review.

Technicalities aside, it is not the Supreme Court's job to dictate foreign policy. It is the role of the Executive to set - and execute - policy, with the Legislature (hopefully) playing a supervisory role. One would hope that the bureaucrats and foreign policy experts in these two branches of government are better informed on what constitutes "national security", than judges versed in law.

It is perhaps a reflection of our lack of trust in politicians that Mr. Ramamurthy took this step. And he may have some valid concerns. Nevertheless, by turning to the judiciary at every step, we ask it to assume all roles of government. That is no less dangerous than a corrupt polity. A system of checks and balances limits the roles of all three branches of government. And in this case, that limit should be on the judiciary.

Equally likely, this is a poor attempt at grabbing attention by Mr. Ramamurthy. He has every right to question his government. But that right comes with the responsibility of accepting that he may be - and in this case is - wrong. He may be an exceptional scientist, but political science is not his forte.

If the Court accepts this, it will set a very dangerous precedent, that will tie the hands of all future governments in international negotiation. The real threat to national security is not the Indo-US law, but rather, the possibility that the Court will actually entertain such irresponsible litigation.

India's Foreign Aid Program - Playing Like The Big Boys

Dweep — Mon, 5 Feb 2007 12:49:42 EST

India has a longstanding foreign aid program and with economic growth has come the ability to play like the big boys, even if not with them. Yet, very little information is available on India's foreign aid program, so I decided to do some web research. I leave it to you to decide if this money is well spent.

Basics

The foreign aid program is called the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme, or ITEC, and was established in 1964.
ITEC covers 156 countries, together with the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Programme (SCAAP).
Both programs are run by the Economic Division of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
The MEA also runs the Indian Council of Cultural Relations, which provides assistance and programs to improve cultural ties, for instance through student and teacher exchange programs.
The ITEC's official aid budget is roughly Rs. 500 million, annually, and over $2 billion has been disbursed since its inception.

Afghanistan as Major Recipient

ITEC is not, however, the only channel for foreign aid. Indeed, large amounts of aid is directed outside ITEC. Afghanistan is by far the largest recipient of that aid. From 2002, to 2006, $650 million had been pledged to India's Assistance Programme for Afghanistan. The MEA and UN have a list of major commitments:

$100 million grant (2001-02)
$70 million grant to build the Zarang-Delaram Highway
$200,000 to the World Bank's Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (2002)
$4 million grant to repair and build the Indira Gandhi Institute of Child Health in Kabul (2003)
$4 million grant to build the Habibba School
$52 million to the World Food Programme, for Afghanistan and Iraq (India is today a net donor to the WFP and IMF).
$25 million to build the Afghan parliament in Kabul
A gift of 3 Airbus airplanes to Ariana, the Afghan national carrier.

Other Bilateral Aid

Beyond ITEC and Afghanistan, significant amounts of aid are directed to Africa, much of it delivered in the form of loans, or delivered in-kind as consultancy. Some of these are offered under the India Development Initiative and include (partly drawn from IndiaDaily editorial):

$218 million in economic aid to Nepal (summer 2006). This is in addition to previous loan waivers for military supplies.
$500 million to West African nations.
$110 million in long-term loans to finance Indian exports to Africa. Offered through the Exim Bank, these loans funded the sale of 500 buses by Tata Motors to Senegal.
$40 million to Angola, for a railway project managed by RITES, Indian Railway's consultancy division.
Support and upgrade of the Farkhor Air Force base in Tajikistan (since 2004). The base is India's first permanent military presence outside India, and operated jointly with Russia and Tajikistan.

The Broader Context

These figures combined, India's foreign aid probably stands at over $150-200 million per year, much more than what is provided through ITEC. However, even this inflated figure hides the vast amounts that are invested through private and public enterprises. For instance, India's oil exploration company ONGC invested $6 billion for railroads in Nigeria (2005). ONGC has also acquired oil assets in Sudan worth more than $750 million.

Even these amounts pale in comparison to China's beneficence, only to Africa. Late last year China unveiled preferential credit of $3 billion for Africa. China has also provided loans of over $100 million to Ghana and Egypt.

Africa is all too happy to receive this aid which comes with significantly fewer conditions than World Bank, US or EU loans. However, the aid has accompanied a general increase in trade and investment flows between Africa and Asia - particularly China and India.

Fundamentally, however, it reflects the shifting balance of power in the world. India and China have the resources to play power politics, without the conditional rhetoric of ethics, development, and values.